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consumption by 4 percent in the short run and by 7.5 percent in the long run.
In contrast, a 10 percent increase in the price for only one period decreases
consumption by only 3 percent.In addition, a one period price increase of 10
percent reduces consumption in the previous period by approximately .7 percent
and consumption in the subsequent period by 1.5 percent.These estimates
illustrate the importance of the intertemporal linkages in cigarette demand
implied by rational addictive behavior.
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Chicago, IL 60637I.Introduction and Summary
Becker and Murphy (1988) develop a theoretical model of rational
addiction and outline its key empirical predictions.This paper uses that
framework to analyze empirically the demand for cigarettes.The data consist
of per capita cigarette sales (in packs) annually by state for the period 1955
through 1985.The empirical results indicate that smoking is addictive.
The Becker-Murphy model follows Stigler and Becker (1977), lannaccone
(1986), Ryder and Heal (1973), Boyer (1978, 1983), and Spinnewyn (1981) by
considering the interaction of past and current consumption in a rational
model.The main feature of these models is that past consumption ofsome
goods influences their current consumption by affecting the marginal utility
of current and future consumption.Greater past consumption of harmfully
addictive goods such as cigarettes stimulates current consumption by
increasing the marginal utility of current consumption more than thepresent
value of the marginal harm from future consumption.Therefore, past con-
sumption is reinforcing for addictive goods.The Becker-Murphy model has
several empirical implications for addictive behavior that includea bimodal
distribution of consumption, quitting by cold turkey,a negative cross effect,
or complementarity, between the price of the good at one time and its
consumption at another time, larger long-run than short-run elasticities of
demand, larger responses to anticipated than unanticipated prices changes, and
larger responses to permanent than temporary price changes.
This paper mainly tests the effect of addictionon the response of
cigarette consumption to a change in cigarette prices.We examine whether
lower past and future prices for cigarettes raise current cigarette
consumption.The empirical results support the implication of addictive
behavior that cross price effects are negative, and that long-run responsesexceed short-run responses.
For examplewe find that a1.0 percent permanent increase in the price
of cigarettes reduces current consumption by 4 percent in the short run and by
1.5 percent in the long run.In contrast, a 10 percent increase in price for
only one period decreases consumption by only 3 percent.In addition, a one
period price increase of 10 percent decreases consumption in the previous
period by approximately .7 percent and consumption in the subsequent period by
1.5 percent.These estimates illustrate the importance of the intertemporal
linkages in cigarette demand implied by addictive behavior.
In myopic models of addictive behavior, past consumption stimulates
current consumption, but individuals ignore the future when making consumption
decisions.We show that these models typically have negative effects of past
prices on current consumption, but no effect of anticipated future prices on
current consumption.Since rational models always exhibit the symmetry of
(compensated) cross price effects implied by optimizing behavior, testing for
the effects of future prices on current consumption distinguishes rational
models of addiction from myopic models.The results strongly reject myopic
behavior and generally support the model of rational addiction.
The Becker-Murphy model also relates the consumption of addictive goods
to stressful events, such as unemployment and divorce.We test these
implications and evaluate the effects of education and religious affiliation
by using state- and time-specific measures of divorce, unemployment, the
fraction of the population with a high school degree, and measures of
religion.The results for stressful events are mixed.Greater divorce rates
are associated with higher levels of cigarette consumption.However,
cigarette consumption is basically unrelated to state unemployment rates,
2perhaps because state differences are mainly anticipated permanent differences
in unemployment rather than unexpected temporary differences that are more
stressful.
The cigarette industry raised the price of cigarettes in 1982 as well as
in 1983 when the federal excise tax on cigarettes increased.Apparently, the
industry also raised cigarette prices in the 1980s in anticipation of a
continuing fall in smoking.Such pricing is inconsistent with perfect
competition, but it is consistent with monopoly power in the cigarette
industry if cigarette smoking is addictive.Since other evidence also
suggests that the industry has monopoly power, this pricing policy is further
testimony to the large effect of addictive behavior on aggregate cigarette
consumption.
II.The Basic Model
Most empirical analyses of consumption deal with single period models or
implicitly assume time-separable utility.By definition, single period models
cannot deal with the dynamics of consumption behavior, and the usual two stage
budgeting property of time-separable models precludes any dynamics other than
those arising from dynamic wealth changes and aggregate consumption effects.
Since addictions imply linkages in consumption of the same good over time, it
is essential to relax the additive separability assumption to model
consumption of addictive goods.
The simplest way to relax the separability assumption is to allow
utility in each period to depend on consumption in that period and consumption
in the previous period.In particular, following Boyer (1978, 1983), we
consider a model with two goods and current period utility in period t given
3by a concave utility function
(1) U(Y, C, Cr1, e)
Here C is the quantity of cigarettes consumed in period t, C1 is the
quantity of cigarettes consumed in period t-l, Y is the consumption of a
composite commodity in period t, and et reflects the impact of unmeasured life
cycle variables on utility.Individuals are assumed to be infinite lived and
maximize the sum of lifetime utility discounted at the rate r.
If the composite commodity, Y,is taken as nurnraire, if the rate of
interest is equal to the rate of time preference, and if the price of
cigarettes in period t is denoted by P, then the consumer's problem is
(2) Maxt-l
U(C, Cr1, e)
such that C0 —C°and
c-l
+ PC) —A°
t— 1
where —l/(l+r).We ignore any effect of C on earnings, and hence on the
present value of wealth (A°), and we also ignore any effect of C on the length
of life.The initial condition for the consumer in period 1,C0,measures the
level of cigarette consumption in the period prior to that under
consideration.
The associated first-order conditions are
4(3a) U(C. C1, Y' e) —A
(3b) U1(C, Cr1,e)+U2(C+i,C, e1)—AP
Equation (3a) is the usual condition that the marginal utility of consumption
in each period, U,, equals the marginal utility of wealth, A.Equation (3b)
implies that the marginal utility of current cigarette consumption, U1, plus
the discounted marginal effect on next period's utility of today's
consumption, U2, equals the current price multiplied by the marginal utility
of wealth.In the case of a harmfully addictive good such as cigarettes, U2
is negative, although the model that we develop simply assumes that this term
is not zero.That is, the predictions contained in this section are also
valid in the case of beneficial addiction (U2 > 0).
Since the marginal utility of wealth, A,is constant over time,
variations in the price of cigarettes over time trace out marginal utility of
wealth-constant demand curves for Y and C.In the time-separable case, these
demand curves depend only on the current price, }'andthe marginal utility
of wealth, but with nonseparable utility, they depend on prices in all periods
through the effects of past and future prices on past and future consumption.
To illustrate, consider a utility function that is quadratic in(
and et. The first-order conditions become
(4a) U +U Y +U C+UC+U e—A
y yy tylt y2 t-1 ye t
(4b) U1 +U1Y+U11,C+UC1+U1et
+fl(U2+ + + U22C+U2e1)—AP
5Equation (4a) can be solved for Ytin terms of A and C:
(5) - (U+Y1C+U22C1+Uyeet)
If equation (5) is used to substitutefor in equation (4b), we get a linear
difference equation that determines current cigaretteconsumption as a
function of past and future cigarette consumption,the current price of
cigarettes, P, and the shift variables e and
(6) Ct —9c1+9C41
+ + + Oe+e3etl
where
-(UU -UU l2yy ly2y
(U11U -U)+fl(U22U -U)
—(U -A)(U1+flU2)
-l
÷ flU2)
(UU -U)+fl(U22U -U)
UA
yy <0
(UU -U2 )+ 8(UU -U2) llyy ly 22yy 2y
-(UU-U U )
— yyle lyey
2 (U11U -U12)+fl(U22UU22)
-fl(UU-U U
— yy2e 2y2e
(U11U, -U)+fl(U22U,-U)
Since is negative by concavity of U, equation (6) implies that
increases in the current price decrease current consumption, C, when the
6marginal utility of wealth is fixed.The effects of changes in future or past
consumption on current consumption depend only on the sign of the term 0.
When 0ispositive, forces that increase past or future consumption, such as
lower past or future cigarette prices, also increase current consumption.In
contrast, when 9is negative, greater past or future consumption decreases
current consumption.Hence current and past consumption are complements, if
and only if,
-(U U-U U)
(7) 9 l2yy -Y2' >0
(UU-U2)+fl(U U-U2) llyy ly 22yy 2y
Since past consumption reinforces current consumption when behavior is
addictive, we say that a good is addictive if and only if an increase in past
consumption leads to an increase in current consumption holding current
prices, et, e÷i, and the marginal utility of wealth fixed.A good is more
addictive when the reinforcement from past consumption is greater.This
definition means that a good is addictive if 9 > 0, and the degree of
addiction is greater when 0islarger.
Equation (6) is the basis of the empirical analysis in this paper.
Cigarette consumption in period t is a function of cigarette consumption in
periods t-l and t+l, the current price of cigarettes,
'andthe
unobservables e and e+i.Ordinary least squares estimation of equation (6)
would lead to biased estimates of the parameters of interest.The
unobservable errors,e, that affect utility in each period are likely to be
serially correlated; even if these variables are uncorrelated, the same error
et directly affects consumption at all dates through the optimizing behavior
implied by equation (6).Positive serial correlation in the unobserved
7effects incorrectly imply that past and future consumption positively affect
current consumption, even when the true value of 9is zero.
Fortunately, the specification in equation (6) suggests a way to solve
this endogeneity problem that is similar to the estimation strategy proposed
by Hansen (1982) and McCalluxn (1979).Equation (6) implies that current
consumption is independent of past and future prices when and C÷1are
held fixed, that any effect of past or future prices must come through their
effects on Ctl or Provided that the unobservables are uncorrelated
with prices in these periods, past and future prices are logical instruments
for C1 and C+1, since past prices directly affect past consumption, and
future prices directly affect future consumption.Therefore, our empirical
strategy is to estimate 0 and 9, the main parameters of equation (6), by
using past and future price variables as instruments for past and future
consumption,
These estimates can be used to derive short- and long-run demand
elasticities for cigarettes, and cross price elasticities between cigarette
consumption at different points in time that test how important addiction is
to aggregate cigarette consumption.It is intuitively clear from equation (6)
that a fall in the current price of cigarettes, P, increases current
consumption, C, which will increase cigarette consumption at time t+1 when 9
is positive. Similarly, if this fall in P is anticipated in t-l, the rise in
C also stimulates a rise in consumption at time t-l.In addition, a
permanent fall in price has a larger effect on current consumption than does a
temporary fall in price, since a permanent fall in price combines a fall in
the current price with a fall in all future prices.
These and other results can be seen more formally by solving the second-
8order difference equation in (6).The dynamics of the system are determined
by the roots of the quadratic equation
(8) + -- 0
The two roots are
9
1 -(1-482fi)1"2 1 + (1
-492)h/2
()i 28 29
with492< I by concavity.These roots are both real and of the same sign as
0. Both roots are positive if and only if cigarettes are addictive (8>0);
otherwise, both roots will be zero or negative.The general solution to
equation (6) is
(10) Ct— 8
1 - h(t+ s) +
8
1 -S
h(t -s) l2 s—l l[2l1s—0
+ (c - 1 qh(s))
°l2
s—i
where
h(t)
—0o + +O2ei+O3e
Equation (10) determines the sign of the effects of changes in the price
of cigarettes in period roncigarette consumption in period t.These
effects, which are temporary in nature since prices in other periods are held
constant, are
9r-t
dC
t
(ha) — 1
-—/ 0as 9 < 0
dPr r>t
dC r
(lib)
t — 1 - 0as0<0
dP r<t°2l
dC 01 t
(lic)
t
________
1 - <0
dP 0[2-h1
Clearly the sign of the cross price effect depends entirely on the sign of 0.
The goods in any two consecutive periods are complements (i.e., negative cross
price effects) if and oniy if 0ispositive.
The temporary current or own price effect given by equation (lic)
depends on t and rises in absolute value as t rises.This is because t
measures the number of years in advance that a change in is anticipated.
If t on the right-hand side of te equation equals one, the price change is
not anticipated until period t. This gives the completely unanticipated own
price effect.If t approaches infinity, the price change is fully anticipated
as of the planning date.Thus, the limit of (llc) as t goes to infinity
yields the fully anticipated temporary own price effect.
Along the same lines, the limit of equation (ha) as t on the right-hand
side of the equation goes to infinity gives the effect of a fully anticipated
temporary change in t+l (r —t+1).If t is set equal to one in the same
equation, one obtains the effect of a change in future price that is not
anticipated until one period before it occurs.Finally, the limit of equation
10(lib) asrgoesto infinity shows the effect of a fully anticipated temporary
change in (r— t-l).The corresponding unanticipated past price effect
results when ronthe right-hand side of (llb) is set equal to one.
If a temporary increase or decrease in or t+l is not anticipated
until period t, C11 remains the same.If a temporary change in t-l is not
anticipated until period t-l, consumption in prior periods does not change.
Since past consumption is held constant in the case of unanticipated price
changes and since an increase in past consumption raises current consumption
given addiction, anticipated price effects are larger in absolute value than
unanticipated price effects.Based on equation (11), the ratio of a fully
anticipated temporary price effect to the corresponding unanticipated price
effect is
-
Inaddition to the ownpriceand cross price effects given in (ha)-
(lic) and to the difference between anticipated and unanticipated price
effects, we are interested in the difference between long- and short-run
responses to permanent price changes.These differences can be
derived directly from equation (10) as well.The effect on consumption in
period t of a permanent reduction in price beginning in period t, which we
*
denote dC/dP ,isgiven by
dC 0[1 -( /)t]
(12)
t 1 1 2
dP 8(1
- -
Onceagain, t on the right-hand side of equation (12) shows the number of
periods in advance that the price change is anticipated.With t equal to one,
the equation gives the effect on current consumption of a completely
unanticipated permanent reduction in price.This effect is
11dC 01
(13) * —
dP 0(1
-
Equation(13) shows the short-run price effect,defined as the impact on
consumption of a reduction in currentprice and all future prices, with past
consumption held constant.
Finally the -effect of a permanent reductionin price in .fl.periodson
consumption in period t is
(14)
-0l2-t
-1 -(1
-
+0112)t)
dP 1
-
1
-
Thelimit of equation (14) ast goes to infinity equals the long-runeffect of
a permanent reduction in price:
dC 0
1
(15)——
dP
Equations (15) and (13) show that the long-run response to apermanent
price reduction exceeds the short-run response by thefactor -1).
This exceeds one if and only if > 1, which is equivalent to having0 > 0.
In addition, the long-run price effect exceeds thefully anticipated temporary
own price effect by the factor [(q2 -i)I/[(1 -
-1)].
The differences between long-run and short-run, temporaryand permanent,
and anticipated and unanticipated, price changes are greaterwhen there is a
greater degree of addiction or complementarity; i.e.,when 9is larger.The
cross price effects, and hence the differencesbetween these various
elasticities are small when 0isclose to zero.The simplicity of a time-
12separable model then would make it superior to the addiction model.However,
if $is quite different from zero, a time-separable model is likely to give
highly misleading predictions about both the short-run and long-run response
of consumption to changes in taxes and prices.
III.A Mvotic Model of Addiction
While the model presented in Becker and Murphy (1988) shows that
addictive behavior can be successfully modeled in a rational choice framework,
many previous researchers have considered nonrational or myopic models of
addition and habit formation (see, for example, Pollak 1970, 1976 or Yaari
1977).We cannot hope to develop an empirical framework that encompasses the
structures used in all nonrational models, but this section presents a myopic
model related to those suggested in the literature.Even this sample model
highlights an important empirical distinction between myopic and nonmyopic
models.
To maintain as much similarity to the previous model as possible, we use
the same utility function and the same assumptions about the goods Y and C.
The key distinction is that myopic individuals fail to consider the impact of
current consumption on future utility and future consumption.Analytically,
this corresponds to individuals using the first-order conditions
(l6a) U +U Y+UC +U C+Ue —
y yy t ylt y2t-l ye t
(16b) U1 +U1Y +U11C+U12C1 +IJ1et
—AP
Equation (l6a) is the same as that used in the previous section since the
consumption of Y has no effects on future utility.However, when individuals
13behave myopically, the first-order condition for cigarette consumption changes
significantly.In contrast to the first-order condition, (4b), in the
previous section, equation (16b) does not contain the future effect
Differences between myopic and rational behavior are highlighted by
solving (l6a-b) for C, as we did in the previous section.Solving for
using (l6a), and substituting the result into equation (16b), we get the
myopic equivalent of equation (6).The major difference between equation (6)
and the myopic equation is that the latter is entirely backward looking.
Current consumption depends only on current price, lagged consumption, the
marginal utility of wealth, and current events.Current consumption is
independent of both future consumption, C÷iand future events, et+l
Because of these distinctions, myopic models and rational models have
different implications about responses to future changes.In particular,
rational addicts increase their current consumption when future prices are
expected to fall, but myopic addicts do not.
Empirically, the difference between the two equations provides a clear
test between rational and myopic addiction.Myopic behavior implies that the
coefficient on instrumented future consumption should be zero, while the
rational model implies that it should have the same sign as the coefficient on
lagged consumption (the sizes differ only by the discount factor).Future
price (and consumption) changes have no impact on the current consumption of a
myopic addict, but they have significant effects on the current consumption of
a rational addict.
IV.Dataand EmDirical Imtlementation
The data consist of a time series of state cross sections covering the
14period from 1955 through 1985.We assume that aggregate cigarette consumption
in these data reflects the behavior of a representative consumer.Table 1
contains definitions, means, and standard deviations of the primary variables
in the data set.A detailed description of the variables and their sources
appears in the first section of the appendix.All prices, taxes, and income
measures were deflated to 1967 dollars with the consumerprice index for all
goods.State- and year-specific cigarette prices were obtained from the
Tobacco Tax Council (1986).The consumption data were taken from the same
source and pertain to per capita tax-paid cigarette sales (inpacks).A
number of studies have used these data to estimate cigarette demand functions.
The most recent one, which contains a review of past research, is by Baltagi
and Levin (1986).None of them contain the refined measures of incentives for
short- and long-distance smuggling of cigarettes across state lines (see
below) that we employ or consider how addiction affects the estimates.
Cigarette sales are reported on the basis of a fiscal year running from
July 1 through June 30.Therefore, real per capita income also is on a fiscal
year basis, and the retail price of a pack of cigarettes pertains to January
of the year at issue.The price is given as a weighted-average price per
pack, using national weights for type of cigarette (regulaiz, king, 100 mm) and
type of transaction (carton, single pack, machine).It is inclusive of
federal, state, and municipal excise taxes and state sales taxes imposed on
cigarettes.
There are 1,581 potential observations in the data set (50 states and the
District of Columbia times 31 years).Missing sales and price data in nine
states in certain years reduce the actual number of observations to 1,516.
There are no gaps in the state-specific price and sales series.That is, if
15one of these variables is reported in year t,itis reported in all future
years.Note that states are deleted Qnjy in years in which data are missing.
The existence of state excise taxes on cigarettes provides much of the
empirical leverage required to estimate the parameters of cigarette demand.
Cigarette tax rates vary greatly across states at a point in time and within a
given state over time.For example, for the period of our sample, the average
tax level (in 1967 dollars) is 6.4 cents per pack or about 21 percent of the
average retail price of 30 cents.The range of tax rates also is substantial.
A rate one standard deviation above the mean is 6 cents higher than a rate one
standard deviation below the mean.This difference is 20 percent of the
average retail price.The variation in retail prices due to differences in
taxes across states and over time within a state helps identify the impact of
price changes on consumption.
The state and time-series data have several pitfalls.In particular, the
diffusion of new information about the health hazards of smoking may have
greatly affected smoking over the period of our sample.To incorporate such
effects, we use time-specific dummy variables.Unfortunately, the
coefficients of these time variables also contain the responses in aggregate
consumption to national changes in the price of cigarettes.
In addition, states differ in demographic composition, income, and other
variables that are correlated with smoking.Our estimates of price effects
would be biased if these differences are also correlated with tax or price
differentials across states.To mitigate this bias, we estimate all
specifications with real per capita income and most specifications with fixed
state effects.In a few models we replace the set of dichotomous variables
for each state except one with the education, divorce, religion, and
16unemployment measures listed in Table 1.These four variables are too
collinear with the state dummies to be included in the same regression.1
The measure of cigarette smoking refers to per capita sales within
states, which can differ from per capita consumption within states.Jhen
adjacent states have significantly different tax policies, there is an obvious
incentive to smuggle cigarettes across states.We constructed three measures
that attempt to correct for both short-distance and long-distance smuggling.
The short-distance smuggling variable uses tax differentials between
surrounding states together with information on the proportion of individuals
living within 20 miles of neighboring states that havelower cigarette tax
rates (for imports) or higher tax rates (for exports).The long-distance
smuggling measure uses the difference between a state's tax and the tax in
each of the states of Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia.These three
states account for almost all of the cigarettes produced in the U.S. based on
value added and had the three lowest excise tax rates in the country starting
in fiscal 1967.The smuggling variables are described in greater detail in
the appendix.
V. Empirical Results
The major implication of the addiction model is that cigarette
consumption decisions are linked over time.In particular, both past and
future consumption affect current consumption.Since future and past prices
have direct effects on future and past consumption, future and past prices
indirectly impact current consumption when current prices are held fixed.
Both future and past prices negatively affect the current consumption of
rational addicts.Table 2 checks the implication of the model that the
17coefficients on all past and future prices in equation (10) should be negative
if cigarettes are addictive.
The first two columns of Table 2 give estimates of a standard cigarette
demand function that includes only current price in addition to income, dummy
variables for years, the smuggling variables and state dummies (column 1) or
state demographic controls (column 2).The implied price elasticity at the
mean of -.71is similar to the estimates in other studies.The highly
significant effects of the smuggling variables (2dtax, sdimp, and sdexp)
indicate the importance of interstate smuggling of cigarettes.
The switch from state dummies in column 1 to state demographic variables
in column 2 lowers the R-square of the regression substantially, but it has
almost no effect on the price and income effects.This indicates that the
correlation between prices and omitted state effects may not be large.Higher
divorce rates are positively associated with smoking.This is consistent with
higher divorce rates causing (or being caused by) greater tension levels that
increase the demand for smoking.Other explanations are also possible.These
estimates confirm the finding by other researchers that more educated people
smoke less (for example, Lewit and Coate 1982).Per capita consumption of
cigarettes is lower in states where Mormons are more prevalent and higher in
states where Catholics are more prevalent.The state unemployment rate is
essentially unrelated to smoking.
The regressions in columns 3 and 4 include one lag andone lead of the
cigarette price in addition to the other variables in columns 1 and 2.2
These coefficients are not consistent estimates of thetrue cross price
effects due to the omission of the other prices implied by equation(10),
which surely are correlated with the included prices.3Nevertheless, they
18suggest that past and future cigarette prices are important determinants of
current cigarette consumption in the direction implied by rational addiction.
The F test that past and future prices have no effect, valid under the null
hypothesis that cigarettes are not addictive, strongly rejects this hypothesis
in both specifications.The F-statistics are 10.7 and 34.8 for the models in
columns 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 3 tests the addictive model more directly by estimating the
following equation (disturbance term omitted) with various instrumental sets:
(17) Ct —0Ct i+ OFCt+l+ °o+ 9it
The instruments used in column 1 consist of past and future prices (Pti and
1+ respectively) plus the other explanatory variables in the model.5
Column 2 adds the current and one period lag values of the state cigarette tax
to the instruments, column 3 further adds the one period lead value of the
tax, and column 4 further adds two additional lags of the price and tax
variables.State excise taxes are used as instruments in some of the models
because consumers may have more knowledge about taxes, especially future
taxes, than about future prices.A complete list of instruments for all
models is given in the second section of the appendix
The estimated effects of past and future consumption on current
consumption are positive in the first four models in Table 3, and the
estimated price effects are significantly negative in all cases.The final
column replaces the state dummies with the state demographic controls used in
columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.The estimated effects are quite similar to those
obtained with state dummies and also show positive and large impacts of past
and future consumption on current consumption.6
19The roots of the quadratic equation (see equation (8)]
(18) - + - —
determinethe dynamic response of consumption to various states, where 9 is
the coefficient on past consumption and is the coefficient on future
consumption.The smaller root, ,givesthe change in current consumption
generated by shocks Co future consumption, dC/dC+i,whilethe inverse of the
larger root gives the effect of shocks to past consumption on current
consumption.Table 4 presents estimates of these roots implied by each of the
five models in Table 3 (standard errors are given in parentheses).The range
of estimates implies that a 10 percent increase in current consumption due
perhaps to a fall in the current price of cigarettes will increase next
period's consumption by between 4.2 and 5.5 percent, and a 10 percent increase
in future consumption (due perhaps to a fall in future price) will increase
current consumption by between 1.4 and 2.6 percent.7
Table 5 uses the estimates from Table 3 to compute the elasticity of
cigarette consumption with respect to various price changes.Estimates of the
long-run response to a permanent change in price based on equation (15) in the
first row range from -.74to-.80,and are about 5 to 10 percent larger than
the estimates in Table 2.More important are the significant cross price
effects.A ten percent unanticipated reduction in current price leads to an
increase of between 1.5 and 1.6 percent in next period's consumption [see row
5, which is based on equation (llb) with r and r-t on the right-hand side
equal to one and minus one, respectively]and to a .5 to .9 percent increase
in the previous period's consumption [see row 4, which is basedon equation
(ha) with t and r-t on the right-hand side both equal to one].
20These estimates imply that a ten percent decline in cigarette prices
causes a short-run increase in cigarette consumption of 4 percent [see row 6,
which is based on equation (13)], which is only about 50 percent of the
estimated long-run response of 7.5 percent.Finally, a 10 percent temporary
increase in the current price of cigarettes would decrease current consumption
by 3.5 percent if it is anticipated [see row 2, which is based on equation
(ha) with t on the right-hand side approaching infinityl and by 3 percent if
it is unanticipated [see row 2, which is based on equation (lla) with t on the
right-hand side equal to one].Each of these responses is less than one-half
of the long-run response of approximately 7.5 percent.
Clearly, the estimates indicate that cigarettes are addictive, that past
and future changes significantly impact current consumption.This evidence is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that cigarette consumers are myopic.Still,
the estimates may not be fully consistent with rational addiction.The point
estimates of the discount factor are implausibly low- -theratio of to
in Table 3 ranges from .31 to .64.However, since future prices are not fully
anticipated by consumers, estimates based on the assumption of perfect
foresight overstate the variability of expected future prices.Due to an
errors-in-variables bias, this leads to an understatement of the effect of
future prices on current consumption.Therefore, uncertainty about future
prices could explain the implausibly high discount rates implied by our
estimates.
The future consumption coefficient also may be biased if the future
price or the future excise tax rate is an endogenous variable that depends on
current consumption.The direction of this bias is not obvious.On the one
hand, states in which antisinoking sentiment is widespread and current smoking
21is relatively low may raise their future excise tax rates in response to the
antismoking campaign.On the other hand, states with high levels of current
cigarette consumption may find that future excise tax hikes are attractive
sources of revenue.8
Chaloupka (1989) provides further evidence in support of a rational
model of cigarette addiction in a micro data set: the second National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey.Using measures of cigarette consumption in
three adjacent periods, he fits demand functions similar to those in Table 3.
He reports positive and significant future and past consumption coefficients
and a short-run price elasticity (-.20)that is less than one-half of the
long-run price elasticity of -.45.
VI.General Model
This section and the following section extend the theoretical results
from Section II and the empirical results from the previous section by
permitting more interactions between past and current consumption.The
Becker-Murphy model differs from the model in Section II by allowing current
utility to depend on a "stock" measure of past consumption, S, where S
satisfies the law of motion
(19) S÷1 —(1-6)S +
and& measures the depreciation rate on the stock.Utility in each period
depends on current cigarette consumption, C, and the current stock, S,as in
(20) Ut —U(C,S)
22To save on notation, we ignore the consumption of other goods, Y, and the
unobservable, e .Thesevariables can be handled exactly as in Section II.
The first-order condition for consumption in period t is
(21)U(C, S)
+r1
T(1-6)rlU5(C, S+) —APt
whereUisthe marginal utility of current consumption and is the marginal
utility of the stock variable, S (Us<0givenharmful addiction).The
infinite series of future terms results from the effect of current consumption
on the stocks in all future periods.These future terms are discounted at the
rate (l -6)since the future is discounted at the rate and the stock
depreciates at the rate 6.Using the first-order conditions for C11, C,
and C1, the definition of the stock in equation (20), and assuming the
utility function is quadratic, we get the second-order difference equation
(22) Ct — OCi +t+i+°o+ + 2-l+
where
—••U;(l-6)+
-(SUccIl-fl(l-6)] +SUcs)
0=
A[l +fl(1-6)2]
—-(1-6)A
2
23— [1+ -s)2lUcc+ ÷2(1
-S)Ucs < 0
Thisequation is a generalization of equation (6),the equation estimated
in the previous section.The major difference is that past and future prices
enter now in addition to currentprice and past and future consumption.
Nevertheless, the basic estimation strategy remainsthe same.Since the
relevant unobservable variables are likely tobe correlated over time,
instrumental variables for and are required to obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters.Tax variables and longer lags of the price
variable are logical candidates for instruments.Additional empirical
leverage is available from the condition that the discountfactor, ,equals
both the ratio of the coefficient of C1 to that of C1and the ratio of the
coefficient of t+l to that of
We can also derive an equation for myopic behavior that is similar tothe
myopic demand function in Section III except that now past price also enters
on the right hand side.Once again, myopic behavior is nested within the
rational behavior: myopic behavior implies zero coefficients in equation (22)
for future price and future consumption.
VII.Empirical Results for the General Model
For the estimated version of (22), rational addiction implies positive
coefficients on past and future consumption, positive coefficients on past and
future prices, and a negative coefficient on current price.Positive
coefficients on past and future prices may seem odd, given that past and
future consumption are complementary with current consumption when behavior is
24addictive.However, controlling for past consumption eliminates the channel
through which past prices affect current consumption.But the only way that
past consumption stays fixed when past prices are higher would be for another
force to offset higher past prices by raising the past stock of consumption
capital.Since this higher value of the stock continues into the present
period (reduced only by depreciation), current consumption must be higher when
past prices are higher.This also explains why past and future prices were
not in the estimating equation of the simple model.That model implies a
depreciation rate of one, so that any larger past stock is eliminated entirely
by depreciation.
The estimates of equation (22) in Table 6 use past, present, and future
tax variables as instruments for past and future consumption.Column 1 uses
state dummy variables for controls, while column 2 uses the state demographic
variables described in previous sections.The signs on the two consumption
variables and the three price variables conform with theoretical predictions.
Past and future consumption positively impact on current consumption.Past
and future prices also have positive effects when past and future consumption
are held fixed.As in previous models, the income effects are positive, and
the smuggling variables continue to be important determinants of state
cigarette sales.The results for the demographic variables also are quite
similar to those found in previous models: lower levels of education and
higher divorce rates are associated with greater cigarette consumption, while
the fraction of the population that is Mormon continues to have a negative
effect.The state unemployment rate is essentially unrelated to smoking.
The estimates in the last three columns of Table 6 impose the
restriction that future price and consumption effects equal the past effects
25multiplied by the discount factor.Column 3 imposes a discount factor of .95
and column 5 imposes oneof .85.Similar results were obtained for all other
discount factors that wetried between .7 and .95.Column 4 uses the state
demographic controls and imposes a discountfactor of .9.None of the
restrictions imposed have a statisticallysignificant effect on the sum of
squared errors, implying that they arevalid.
The different models have similar resultsthat in most ways support
rational addiction.The sum of the coefficients on past and future
consumption are always less than unity, which indicatesstable equilibrium.
In all models, an exogenous force that raiseseither past or future
consumption would also raise current consumption.As predicted, past and
future prices have positive coefficients, and currentprice has a negative
coefficient.The estimated roots of the difference equation forconsumption
(not shown) are always both significantly positive.
The elasticity estimates in Table 7 imply a greater long-run response to
a permanent price reduction than to a temporaryreduction or to a short-run
reduction (compare row I to rows 2,3, and 6).However, while almost all the
elasticity estimates have the signs predicted by the addictionmodel, the
effects of past prices on current consumption are not alwayssignificantly
different from zero, and the effects of future prices are essentially zeroin
all models.Although these estimates do not fully support rational addiction,
they are clearly inconsistent with myopic behavior.Myopia implies zero
coefficients on future consumption and future price.This hypothesis is
rejected strongly in all models.In models 1 and 2, where future effects are
estimated independently of past effects, the F-statistics that both future
effects are zero are 18.6 and 21.3, respectively, which reject the hypothesis
26chat these effects are zero.
A time-separable demand function for cigarettes implies zero
coefficients for all instrumented future and past effects of consumption and
prices.It is obvious from looking at the regressions that this hypothesis
too is decisively rejected.The F-statistics for models 1 and 2 are 615.7 and
799.2, respectively.
Even though our estimates indicate that the equilibrium aggregate amount
of smoking is stable, unstable steady states may greatly affect the overall
response of cigarette smoking to changes in cigarette prices.This conclusion
is supported by the evidence that almost all the effect of higher prices on
teenage smoking and more than half the effect on adult smokers are due to a
decline in the number of smokers (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman 1981; Lewit and
Coate 1982).The possible role of unstable steady states is inferred from the
fact that the large decline in the number of smokers is not due entirely to
heterogeneity in the amount smoked, whereby people who smoke only a few
cigarettes per day stop smoking when cigarette prices increase.Data from the
second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey reveal that 60 percent
of persons who had stopped smoking for less than one year smoked at least one
pack of cigarettes per day during the last year in which they smoked.The
same survey indicates that 68 percent of persons who had stopped smoking for
one or more years smoked at least one pack a day during their period of
maximum consumption.
Even a modest increase in cigarette prices could induce smokers who
happen to be near unstable steady states to cease (see the analysis in becker
and Murphy 1988).Those who had been trying to find an easy way to quit would
have an added financial incentive to do so, and others near unstable steady
27states also might decide toquit.The existence of unstable steady states
means that some peoplewho smoke a lot will be the "marginal" smokers with
respect to changes in cigarette prices andother variables.
VIII.Monopoly and Addiction
Both the demand for cigarettes and the organization of the cigarette
industry have been studied frequently (on the latter, see, for example, 8am
1968; Sumner 1981; Appelbauni 1982; Ceroski 1983; and Porter 1986).Yet
neither type of study has highlighted the habitual-addictive side of smoking,
even though cigarette smoking has long been recognized as a habit that is
among the most difficult to break.
The cigarette industry in the U.S.is highly concentrated.Two
companies (R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris) account for about 70 percent of
output, and the studies just cited conclude in general that cigarette
companies have significant monopoly power.The analysis in previous sections
shows that the habitual aspects of cigarette smoking significantly alter
estimates of its response to changes in prices and other variables, and
addiction affects optimal monopoly pricing and other policies.
To illustrate the relation between pricing and addiction, we consider
monopoly pricing when there are only two periods.Quantities demanded in each
period are given by the Cobb-Douglas functions10
(23) q1 —a1pjElpf
-E 7 (24) q2 —a2p22 q1
whereE1,C2 >0, 0 < g < 1, 0y < 1 with a reinforcing but stable habit and
28p is the price expected in period 2 by consumers in period 1.Note that the
price elasticities in equations (23) and (24) pertain to the individual firm,
while the estimated price elasticities at sample means in Sections V and VII
pertain to the market.Theoretically and empirically, the former elasticities
are larger in absolute value than the latter (for example, Sumner 1981;
Appelbauni 1982).
The present value of profits over the two periods is (with a zero
interest rate)
(25) it— p1q1+p2q2 -c1q1 -c2q2
where c1 and c2 are the constant costs in each period inclusive of excise
taxes.Substituting for q1 and q2 gives profits as a function of prices
alone:
it—a1plp+
-c1a1plp-c2a2ap2p1p
The firm chooses p1 and p2 to maximize it.Thefirst-order condition for
p1 is
l-E
1 -y-l (1-7) -E* g-y(l--y)
(26) p1 +c1—a1a2p1i p2 2p2 (p2- c2)
*
Wehold p2 constant when differentiating with respect to p1 because rational
expectations of p2 are not affected by changes in p1 with these demand
functions.This reduces to the familiar condition that marginal revenue
equals marginal cost [p1(l
-l/ei)—c1]when either y —0(no addictive
29effects of consumption) or when p2—c2(competitive pricing in the second
period).However, marginal revenue is less than marginal cost in period 1if
> c2and if consumption is addictive.The reason is that profits in
periods 2 are higher when is larger (p1 is smaller) because an increase in
raises q2 (when y > 0).As it were, a monopolist may lower price to get
more consumers "hooked" on the addictive good.Note that, if the monopolist
can engage in price discrimination, he may have an incentive to offer lower
prices to persons who currently do not consume the good.This can explain why
cigarette companies distributed free cigarettes on college campuses in the
past.In effect college students were being offered a zero current price but
a positive future price once they became addicted.
The right-hand side of equation (26) shows that the optimal marginal
revenue in period 1 is lower relative to marginal cost when the good is more
addictive (the larger is -y),demandin period 2 is stronger (the larger is
a2), demand in period 1 is weaker (the smaller is a1), and when p2 minus c2 is
bigger.With a sufficiently large positive effect on q2 of a lower p1, a
monopolist might choose a p1 that is less than c1, or a p1 that is in an
inelastic region of demand (e1 < l).h1
The choice of an optimal p2 depends on whether the monopolist can
precomrnit p2 to consumers in period one.With precommitment, a decline in p2
stimulates q1 by lowering p2 .Butwithout precommitment, actual changes in
do not affect p2 ,andhence do not affect q1.Without precommitrnent,
rational consumers simply anticipate that the monopolist chooses p2 to
maximize profits in period 2, given the level at that time ofq1 .With
rational expectations, p—p2(the optimal p2), and a monopolist who cannot
precominit takes both q1 and p2 as given when choosing p2
30The first-order condition for p2 to a monopolist who cannot precommit is
(27) a2(l-E2)p2q —a2c2(-e2)p2q
or
E2l
(28)
This is the usual condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost.In
particular, a monopolist who cannot precoinmit would never choose p2 in the
inelastic region of the demand curve in period 2 >1)because p2 cannot
influence q1 without precommitment.Without going into details of the case
where precomntitment is possible, it should be clear that a precominitted p2
would be below the p2 given by equation (38) because a precommitted lower p2
*
reducesp2, and hence raises q1 and profits in period 1 (assuming p1 >c1).
When p2 is not preconunitted, equations (37) and (38) can be substituted
into the first-order condition for p1 to get
(29) c1-a2a' (1
-1
El
If1 < > 1+g-y(l --y),which follows if >5/4,then an increase in p2
raises p1.'
This analysis is helpful in understanding the rise in cigarette prices
in recent years.Much of the drop in demand for cigarettes since 1981
documented by Harris (1987) and others is due to greater information about
health hazards, restrictions imposed on smoking in public places, and the
banning of cigarette advertising on radio and television.Equation (29) shows
31that p1 increases when demand falls by the same percentagein both periods (a1
and a2 fall by the same percentage); p1 increases even morewhen future demand
is expected to fall by a larger percentagethan current demand.A rise in p1
with c1 fixed raises profit and profit margin (the differencebetween price
and average cost) in period 1.
Several studies have commented about the apparent paradox that cigarette
companies have been posting big profits while smoking is declining, and have
documented the faster rise in cigarette prices than in apparent costs (Harris
1987; Dunkin, Oneal, and Kelly 1988).Indeed, according to Adler and Freedman
(1990, p. 1),"...Oneof the great magic tricks of market economics.. .[isj how
to force prices up and increase profits in an industry in which demand falls
by tens of billions of cigarettes each year."Incorporation of the addictive
aspects of smoking into the analysis resolves this paradox if cigarette
companies have some monopoly power.Since p1 increases, cigarette companies'
profits rise in the short run precisely because of the decline in smoking.
An event study of the common stock prices of cigarette companies could detect
whether they fell relative to a risk-adjusted index of stock prices as the
price of cigarettes rose during the 1980s.13
If consumers and producers know that an excise tax on cigarettes will be
imposed next period, and if the cigarette industry were competitive with
constant costs, present prices would not change and future prices would rise
by the size of the tax.If the industry were oligopolistic but if cigarettes
were not addictive, present prices still would not change, while future prices
would rise by the same percentage as tax-inclusive future costs (with a
constant elasticity of demand).Since price exceeds costs under monopoly,
future monopolistic prices would rise by a greater amount than the excise tax.
32The rise in cigarette prices does usually exceed the rise in cigarette taxes,
which is evidence that the industry is not fully competitive (Sumner 1981).
Incorporation of the addictive aspects of smoking leads to a further
test of whether the cigarette industry is fully competitive.If smokers are
addicted, and if the industry is oligopolistic, an expected rise in future
costs due to future taxes induces a rise in current prices [if 2' the price
elasticity of demand for one of the oligopolists, in equation (28) exceeds
5/4], even though current demand (q1) falls when future prices are expected to
increase.A higher federal excise tax on cigarettes was widely expected to go
into effect at the beginning of 1983.cigarette prices increased sharply not
only in 1983 but also prior to the tax increase during 1982.The price
increase in 1982 has been taken as evidence that "the tax increase served as a
focal point [or coordinating device] for an oligopolistic price increase"
(Harris 1987, p. 101).That ispossible, but an increase in 1982 would have
occurred even if cigarette producers had no such coordinating problems.An
oligopolistic producer of an addictive good would raise prices prior to an
anticipated increase in the tax on his product.
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'State-specific education and divorce measures were available for the
Census of Population years of 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980; and state-specific
religion measures were available for the years 1952, 1971, and 1980.Values
for other years were computed using state-specific exponential growth rates.
Hence, differences in education, divorce, or religion are almost fully
"explained" by the state and time variables.The algorithm also had to be
applied to estimate the unemployment rate during the early years of the time
series, and it is highly collinear with the set of state and time dummies.
21n the regressions in columns 3 and 4, the first observation on the
dependent variable pertains to 1956 or to the second year in which both
consumption and price are reported, and the last observation pertains to 1984.
Fewer than 102 observations are lost because 65 of 1,581 cases have missing
data in the regressions in columns 1 and 2, while 58 of 1,479 cases have
missing data in the regressions in columns 3 and 4.Nine states have missing
sales in 1955 and other years.Two of these states, Alaska and Hawaii, also
F- 1have missing prices.For these two states price is missing every year that
sales are missing and in the first year in which sales are reported.
Consequently, the number of cases with missing data falls by 7 rather than by
9 when one lag and lead of price are included in the regressions.
3Another bias arises because the dependent variable pertains to
purchases rather than to consumption.If cigarettes can be stored, current
purchases will rise in response to an increase in future or past price.This
causes an underestimation of the absolute values of the future and past price
coefficients.Thus, the negative and significant cross price effects in
columns 3 and 4 may be even larger and more significant than they appear.To
the extent that cigarettes spoil if they are stored for a period as long as a
year, the bias just discussed is not important.
4The F tests are performed by estimating regressions with and without
past and future price using 1,421 observations in each case.
5According to the solution of the second-order difference equation (6)
or (22), consumption at any point in time depends on the current value and on
..U past and future values of a given exogenous variable [see equation (10)).
Clearly, not all these variables can be used to predict Ci and
Therefore, both these variables are regressed on and X (a
vector of the additional exogenous variables at time t).This procedure is
followed because the set of exogenous variables should not vary among reduced
form equations.Note that no past prices of C1 j> 1) appear in the
reduced form regression for Ctl, and no future prices of C÷1 i> 1)
appear in the reduced form regression for
6The residuals from several of the models in Table 3 were examined for
autocorrelation.The algorithm assumed a common time-series error structure
F-2among states, and noautocorrelatiorts for lag lengths greater than 10.The
first ten autocorrelation coefficients wereobtained and were used to compute
a variance-cOVariancematrix of regression coefficients (var) of the form
var —(s)•l'V('Z)1,
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance termand
The last equation specifies a matrix of the predicted valuesof the endogenous
variables (Y) and exogenous variables (X1) in the structural demand function
for current consumption.Standard errors of regression coefficients based on
this algorithm (available on request) were very similar to those that did not
correct for autocorrelation.In most cases the corrected standard error was
smaller than the corresponding uncorrected standard error.The same comment
applies to the estimates in Table 6.The regression residuals also were
examined for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity due to averaging over an
unequal number of people in each state.This analysis suggested that there
were no efficiency gains to weighting by the square root of the state
population.
7The above computations assume that consumption this period, last
period, and next period are approximately equal.
8Note that a Cranger (1969) causality test of the relationship between
cigarette consumption and the excise tax is not helpful in the context of our
model.Suppose that the current tax rate was regressed on the lagged tax rate
and on lagged consumption.Significant lagged consumption coefficients would
F-3not necessarily indicate causality from consumption to the tax because lagged
consumption should respond to the current tax given rational addiction.
9Frank Chaloupka kindly supplied us with the above estimates.
'°These demand functions have constant price elasticities, while the
demand functions estimated in Sections V and VII have constant slopes.We use
the constant elasticity form in this section for analytical convenience and
indicate how our conclusions would differ if the demand functions were linear.
"Of course, we assume that the demand function for current consumption
has a constant price elasticity.In this context the constant value could be
smaller than one.More generally, if the demand function did not have a
constant elasticity, the monopolist might choose to operate in the inelastic
segment of it.
'2The term (l--i)takeson a maximum value of 1/4 when -y equals 1/2.
Since g is less than one, the condition in the text is sufficient but not
necessary.
'3Most of the results just obtained hold in certain cases with linear
demand functions.In particular, price could rise in period 1 in response to
parallel downward shifts in the demand functions in both periods.The results
in this section suggest that it may not be entirely appropriate to treat price
as an exogenous variable in fitting cigarette demand functions for reasons
other than those mentioned in Section V and note 9.We reemphasize, however,
that market demand functions are estimated in Sections V and VII, while the
demand functions discussed in this section pertain to individual firms.
Moreover, in the context of a non-addictive model, Porter (1986) reports
little difference between cigarette market demand functions that treat price
as exogenous and demand functions that treat price as endogenous.
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R—3APPENDIX
I.Data
Cigarette sales were missing for nine states in the years specified
below.
Alaska, 1955—1959
Hawaii, 1955—1960
California, 1955—1959
Colorado, 1955—1964
Maryland, 1955—1958
Missouri, 1955
North Carolina, 1955—1970
Oregon, 1955—1966
Virginia, 1955—1960
The price of cigarettes was missing for Alaska and Hawaii in each year in
which sales were missing.In addition, price was not reported for the former
state in 1960 and for the latter state in 1961.
The state excise tax on a pack of cigarettes is a weighted average of
the tax rates in effect during the fiscal year, where the weights are the
fraction of the year each rate was in effect.The Tobacco Tax Council gives
the price of cigarettes as of November.The price used in our regressions in
fiscal year t equals five—sixths of the price in November of year t—1 plus
one—sixth of the price in November of year t, adjusted for changes in the
state excise tax rate during the fiscal year.In particular, the state excise
tax as of the date of the price was subtracted from the price; the average
price exclusive of tax was computed from the preceding formula; and the
average excise tax was added back to the price.The algorithm was modified in
A-icertain years in which price was reportedin October.The price variable
published by the Tobacco Tax Council (1986)excludes municipal excise taxes
imposed on cigarettes by one or more municipalitiesin certain states.We
created a state—specific average municipal excise tax rate[the sum of
revenues from municipal cigaretteexcise taxes for the state as reported by
the Tobacco Tax Council (various years) dividedby state cigarettes sales in
packs] and added this variable to the price.Note that the state excise tax
rate defined in Table 1 and used as aninstrumental variable for past and
future consumption in Tables 3 and 6 is inclusive of the averagemunicipal
excise tax rate.
In every state except Hawaii and New Hampshire, the excise tax on
cigarettes was a specific tax (fixed amount per pack) during oursample
period.In Hawaii the tax was 40 percent of the wholesale price throughout
the period.In New Hampshire the tax was 42 percent of retail price until
fiscal 1976.Equivalent taxes per pack in these two states were computed by
the Tobacco Tax Council.
Short—distance smuggling or casual bootlegging refers to out—of—state
purchases by residents of a neighboring state with a higher excise tax.The
short—distance importing and exporting incentive measures are used as separate
regressors because consumption in an importing state (defined assales plus
imports) depends on the difference between the own state and the out—of—state
price or tax.Consumption in an exporting state does not depend on this
difference.Of course, both imports and exports respond to the tax
difference.Long—distance smuggling or organized bootlegging refers to
systematic attempts to ship cigarettes from North Carolina, Virginia, or
Kentucky to other states.These cigarettes are sold at the retail prices
A—2prevailing in the relevant states without paying the excise tax, which is
imposed at the wholesale level.Consumption in the importing state does not
depend on the difference between that state's tax and the tax in North
Carolina, Virginia, or Kentucky.Hence, long—distance importing and exporting
incentives can be summarized by a single variable since imports summed over
all states in a given year must equal exports summed over all states in that
year.Given the definitions of the three smuggling variables in Table 1,
their regression coefficients all should be negative.
Short distance casual smuggling effects are measured by two variables,
one for imports and one for exports.The importing variable is
sdtimp —
3
where is the fraction of the population of state i(the higher tax state)
living within 20 miles of state j(thelower tax state), and T and T are the
cigarette excise tax rates in each state.The weights are computed from the
1970 Census of Population, and the summation is taken over neighboring states.
The exporting variable is given by
sdtexp —k1t(T_T)(POP/POP)
3
where is the fraction of the higher taxed state's population living within
20 miles of the exporting state (state i) and P0P denotes the populationof
state j.Thereason that the population ratio is used in the exportvariable
is that total exports from state ito state jshoulddepend on the population
of state jthatlives near state i or P0P, multiplied by Since the
dependent variable in the regression model is state—specific percapita sales,
A-3dependent variable in the regression model is state—specific percapita sales,
the population of state I enters the denominator.The tax differentials in
the preceding formulas include or exclude municipal excise taxes depending on
the border area at issue.
The construction of the long distance smuggling variable is based on
several assumptions.It is assumed that Virginia and North Carolina share the
long distance exporting to all states in the Northeast and Southeast as well
as any state within 500 miles of either.All Western states within 1,000
miles of Kentucky are assumed to import from Kentucky.States more than 1,000
miles from Kentucky, Virginia, or North Carolina are assumed to do no long
distance smuggling.The long distance smuggling variable based on these
assumptions is given by
2dtaxi — (Ti—TKY) if importing from Kentucky
—zNC(Ti_l'Nc)+ zVA(Ti_TVA) if importing from N.C. and Va.
—(TKy—Tj)(P0Pj/P0PKy) for Kentucky
— for i —N.C.,Va.
The weights used for states that import from North Carolina and Virginia are
the shares of value added in the production of cigarettes in these two states
combined accounted for by each one.That is, ZNC —valueadded in N.C./(value
added in N.C. + value added in Va.).Note that total imports from Kentucky,
North Carolina, or Virginia to state i depend on the population of i which
cancels when imports are expressed on a per capita basis.If state i's excise
tax was lower than the exporting state's excise tax, which occurred in a few
states prior to fiscal 1967, the tax difference was set equal to zero.
State—specific money per capita income in fiscal year t is a simple
A-4average of money per capita income incalendar years t—l and t.The consumer
price index in fiscal year t, which is notstate—specific, is defined in a
similar manner. Per capita income by state was taken from the Bureauof
Economic Analysis (various years).Unemployment rates by state were obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (variousyears).The state—specific
education and divorce measures were availablefor the Census of Population
years of 1950, 1960, 1970, and1980 (Bureau of the Census 1983).Values for
other years were computed using state—specificexponential growth trends.
These values were adjusted so that a weighted averageof the variable at issue
for an intercensal year was equal to the observednational rate as reported by
the Bureau of the Census (various years).For example, let be the
percentage of the population 25 years of ageand older with at least a high
school education in thethstate in year t based on the exponentialgrowth
trend.Define x as
x—Zk.x.
.1
where is the fraction of the U.S. population aged 25 andolder residing in
the state in year t.Finally, let y be the observed percentage of the
U.S. population aged 25 and older with at least ahigh school education in
year t.Then the adjusted estimate for thethstate (yj) is given by
(y/x)x.t.
In the case of the divorce measure (the fractionof women aged 25 through 34
who are divorced), the weight (k) in the firstformula pertains to the
fraction of women aged 25 through 34 in the U.S. whoreside in thethstate.
The same algorithm also was employed to estimateunemployment rates that were
missing in certain states during the early yearsof the time series.
A—SThe religion measures were reportedfor the years 1952, 1971, and 1980
from surveys conducted bythe National Council of the Churches of Christ and
the Glenmary Research Center(Whitman and Trimble 1956; Johnson, Picard, and
Quinn 1974; Quinn et al. 1982).Values for other years were computed using
the algorithm employed for educationand divorce.Since national measures
were not available for yearsother than those in which the three surveys were
conducted, a weighted average of thestate—specific estimated values could not
be constrained to equal a national figure.
II.Instruments for Two—Staze Least Squares Models
The five sets of instruments in the models in Table 3 are asfollows.
All models have as instruments year dummy variables, thesmuggling measures,
income, current price, and one period lead and lag valuesof price.Each
model also has as instruments either state dummy variables or the
socioeconomic variables (education, divorce, religion, and unemployment),
depending on which of these sets of variables was included in thestructural
equation in question.Model 1 in Table 3 has no other instruments.Model 2
includes the current tax and the one period lag value of the tax.Model 3 and
5 include the current tax and the one period lead and lag values of the price
and tax.Model 4 adds the two period lag values of the tax and price to the
additional variables used in models 3 and 5.The potential number of cases in
a model with one lag and one lead of price as instruments is1,479 (the 29
years from 1956 through 1984 times 50 states and the Districtof Columbia).
The corresponding figure in a model with two lags and one lead of price as
instruments is 1,428 (the 28 years from 1957 through 1984 times 50 states and
the District of Columbia).Missing data (see note 2) reduce the actual number
A—6of cases to 1,414 in the first model and to 1,370 in the second model.
The common set of instruments used in all five models in Table 6 is
specified above. Models 1 and 2 also include the current value of the state
excise tax and the one period lead and lag values of the tax.Models 3,4,
and 5 exclude the last two regressors but constrain the coefficients on past
and future price and on past and future consumption.
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A—8Table 1
Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations of Variables
(s.d. —standarddeviation)
Per capita cigarette consumption in packs in fiscal year t,as
derived from state tax—paid sales (mean —124.800,s.d. —31.958)
Average retail cigarette price per pack in January of fiscal year
t in 1967 cents (mean —29.600,s.d. —3.300)
income Per capita income on a fiscal year basis, in hundreds of 1967
dollars (mean —29.303,s.d. —8.539)
.dtax Index which measures the incentives to smuggle cigarettes long
distance from Kentucky, Virginia, or North Carolina.The index is
positively related to the difference between the state's excise tax
and the excise taxes of the exporting states.See panel B for
more information on this variable and the following smuggling
variables (mean ——.400,s.d. —17.800)
sdtexp Index which measures short distance (export) smuggling incentives.
The index is a weighted average of differences between the
exporting state's excise tax and excise taxes of neighboring
states, with weights based on border populations (mean ——.800,
s.d. —1.800)
sdtimp Index which measures short distance (import) smuggling incentives
in a state.Similar to sdtexp (mean —.500,s.d. —.800)
hs Percentage of state population ages 25 and over with
at least a high school education (mean —52.880,s.d. —14.850)
divorce Percentage of state female population aged 25—34
that are divorced (mean —4.960,s.d. —14.850)
unemp State unemployment rate as a percentage (mean —5.410,s.d. —
2 .300)
mormon Percentage of state population that are Mormon (mean =2.696,s.d.
—10.010)
sobapt Percentage of state population that are Southern Baptist (mean —
6,330,s.d. —9.120)
catholic Percentage of state population that are Catholic (mean —18.940,
s.d. —13.410)
tax Sum of state and local excise taxes on cigarettes in 1967 cents
per pack (mean —6.400,s.d. —2.900)Table 2
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions,Dependent Variable —C
(Absolute t-statistics in parentheses, interceptsnot shown)
(l)* (2)** (3)* (4)**
P
i
-2.073 -1.949
(7.89) (4.30)
P -3.018 -3.216 -.626 -.685
t (15.40) (13.39) (1.72) (1.09)
+i.
-.834 -.809
t (3.05) (1.72)
Y 1.530 1.610 1.620 1.660
t (8.88) (13.62) (9.14) (13.50)
.Qdtax -.366 -.337 -.304 -.314
(7.37) (9.56) (5.99) (8.63)
sdtimp -1.847 1.598 -2.042 1.115
(3.60) (2.60) (4.03) (1.80)
sdtexp -6.096 -8.847 -5.964 -8.843
(18.00) (33.80) (17.20) (33.10)
hs
-.335 -.388
(2.91) (3.25)
divorce 5.97 6.17
(14.30) (14.20)
mormon -.443 -.441
(8.53) (8.25)
catholic .370 .383
(8.07) (8.05)
sobapt .116 .118
(1.29) (1.26)
unemp .497 .388
(1.76) (1.32)
R-squared .909 .724 .917 .730
N 1,516 1,516 1,421 1,421
*Regressorsinclude state and year dummy variables.
**Regressorsinclude year dummy variables.Table 3
Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions,
Dependent Variable —C(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)*
(2)** (3)** (4)** (5)***
.424 .375 .443 .480
(9.06) (9.25) (11.80) (14.50) (8.90)
.133 .239 .172 .229 .205
(2.42) (5.11) (3.87) (5.94) (3.37)
-1.392 -1.229 -1.230 - .981 -1.141
(8.96) (9.16) (9.17) (8,44) (7.29)
.831 .753 .741 .607 .595
(7.31) (7.42) (7.31) (6.72) (7.39)
.dtax -.187 - .147 - .161 - .125 - .110
(5.40) (4.78) (5,26)(4.46) (5.32)
sdtimp -1.342 -1.202 -1.248 -1.075 -.006
(4.78) (4.65) (4.83)(4.57) (.21)
sdtexp -3.202 -2.868 -2.897 -2.404 -3.187
(11.30) (11.90) (12.00)(11.60) (8.36)
hs
-.162
(3.35)
divorce 2.08
(6.82)
mormon -. 145
(5.21)
catholic .126
(5.33)
sobapt .043
(1.20)
unemp .046
(.39)
R-squared .975 .979 .979 .983 .949
N 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,370 1,414
*
Ahat over a variable means it is endogenous.Intercepts not shown.
Regressors include state and year dummy variables.
Regressors include year dunimy variables.Table 4
Roots of Difference Equation
(approximate standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 .141 2.218
(.062) (.224)
Model 2 .265 2.405
(.056) (.254)
Model 3 .188 2.069
(.052) (.162)
Model 4 .263 1.822
(.049) (.114)
Model 5 .229 1.976
(.074) (.201)Table 5
Price Elasticities for Two-Stage Least Squares Models
(approximate t-statistics in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Long run -•743
-.7i3 -.757 -.799 -.791
(13.06) (12.43) (12.43) (10.67) (11.81)
Ow-n price:
anticipated -.374 -.363 -.350 -.310 -.341
(10.73) (11.13) (10.86) (9.87) (9.27)
unanticipated -.351 -.323 -.318 -.266 -.301
(9.97) (10.09) (10.10) (9.20) (8.28)
Future price:
unanticipated -.050 -.086 -.060 -.070 -.069
(2.37) (4.90) (3.70) (5.14) (3.21)
Past price:
unanticipated -.158 -.134 -.154 -.146 -.153
(8.99) (8.01) (9.80) (9.43) (8.23)
Short run -.408 -.440 -.391 -360 -391
(9.34) (9.51) (9.69) (8.80) (7.66)Table 6
General Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions,
Dependent Variable —C(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
(6)** (7)*** (8)** (9)*** (l0)**
C
,
.495 .505 .417 .470 .441
(8.03) (7.66) (14.79) (22.60) (14.93)
C .294 .350 .396 .423 .375
(3.99) (4.59) (14.79) (22.60) (14.93)
i
.613 .758 .662 .890 .694
t- (2.83) (3.57) (4.01) (6.74) (4.00)
Pt
-1.685 -1.906 -1.697 -1.931 -1,687
(10.20) (11.30) (10.40) (12.30) (10.37)
.569 .772 .628 .801 .590
t (2.53) (3.58) (4.01) (6.74) (4.00)
.502 .274 .480 .215 .474
(4.79) (3.56) (4.53) (3.05) (4.50)
.2dtax -.100 -.053 -.072 -.040 -.076
(3.06) (3.19) (2.66) (2.69) (2.85)
sdtimp -.976 -.302 -.877 -. 337 -.888
(4.30) (1.74) (4.07) (2.11) (4.14)
sdtexp -1.970 -1.491 -1.795 -1.137 -1.798
(6.06) (3.82) (5.71) (3.28) (5.78)
hs -.091 -.074
(2.69) (2.43)
divorce .884 .650
(3.06) (2.47)
mormon -.057 -.040
(2.44) (1.87)
catholic .045 .030
(2.17) (1.58)
sobapt .011 .002
(.44) (.10)
unemp -.037 -.025
(.46) (.36)
R-squared .986 .978 .986 .981 .986
N —1,414all models
A hat over a variable means it is endogenous.Intercepts not shown.
Regressors include state and year dummy variables.
Regressors include year dummy variables.Table 7
Price Elasticities for General Two-Stage Least Squares Models
(approximate t-statistics in parentheses)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Long run -.565 -.612 -.515 -.533 -.517
(4.30) (4.87) (3.29) (3.02) (3.28)
Ownprice:
anticipated -.412 -.462 -.420 -.468 -.419
(11.62) (12.37) (11.43) (12.58) (11.44)
unanticipated -.422 -.480 -.409 -.461 -.406
(10.45) (11.39) (11.61) (13.25) (11.58)
Future price:
unanticipated .013 .020 .016 -.007 -.016
(0.44) (0.77) (0,61) (0.38) (0.62)
Past price:
unanticipated -.077 -.081 -.017 -.008 -.019
(1.98) (2.09) (0.61) (0.38) (0.62)
-. 386 -.410 -.465 -.496 -.460
(5.25) (4.94) (5.40) (5.50) (5.77)
Short run -.402 -.444 -.442 -.478 -.437
(9.02) (9.75) (7.71) (9.11) (8.24)